VONOVIA WKN: A1ML7J ISIN: DE000A1ML7J1 Kürzel: VNA Forum: Aktien Thema: Hauptdiskussion

Hab's auch gerade gelesen. Für 488.000€ eingekauft, zum Preis von 24,40€. 👍

ja, Director's Dealing gab es bei ihm aber auch schon mal bei einem 50% höheren Kurs.

Rolfi hat zugeschlagen

Und die 25 € sehen wir heute ganz sicher wieder.

Inzwischen dürfte fast alles eingepreist sein. Und wenn sich die Zinssenkungen noch leicht verschieben sollten, wäre das auch kein Beindruck.

Bin sehr optimistisch für den Kurs und habe daher gekauft. Neu Bewertung der Immobilien sind eher theoretischer Natur, bringen aber genau so viel Mieteinnahmen und somit Gewinn.

Erstmal über die Dividende freuen. Die Worst-Case-Szenarien Kapitalerhöhung, Dividendenstreichung, Finanzierungsprobleme sind vom Tisch. Von daher Hold.

https://www.wiwo.de/finanzen/immobilien/immobilien-zinsen-und-preise-gesunken-ist-das-die-trendwende-auf-dem-immobilienmarkt/29710748.html Allgemein Zinsen+Wohnimmobilien

Aktuelle Analyse im Blick: JP Morgan Chase & Co.: Overweight für Vonovia SE (ex Deutsche Annington)-Aktie https://finanzen.net/nachricht/aktien-jp-morgan-chase-co-overweight-fuer-vonovia-se-ex-deutsche-annington-aktie-13348644

Earnings call Transcript q and A: " Paul May No. I appreciate that. And if you work it through to your NTA, your NTA yield is very low on a free cash flow basis. And I think we need to look at this as you say free cash flow is king in terms of within the business. You've come around to the idea, similarly to LEG, came around to the idea about a year ago, that free cash flow is what matters and not FFO and not any of the other metrics that we were looking at. And therefore, on a free cash flow basis, the free cash flow yield on German residential is very, very low, irrespective, almost as to what the gross yield is. So this focus on this gross yield number that is 50%, 60% higher than or -- sorry, it's more than a 100% higher than the operating free cash flow. The operating free cash flow is about is about 50%, 60% lower than your revenue. Why is there this focus? Why do the values focus on it? Why do you focus on it? Why does anyone talk about gross yield when it is not relevant? Rolf Buch Why you are not looking on Page 43, because I think we have it here. So this is based on fair values and NTA on the left side and based on implied, which is actually market cap. So I learned in the U.S., the NTA concept doesn't exist in the U.S., and in the U.S., it's relatively easy. What we call NTA is for them actually market cap and what we call JV is for them market cap plus debt. So if you apply this on the left side, on the right side, you see that operating free cash flow, which is actually exactly what we would like to deliver you, which is a cash flow, which is ready for reinvestment or distribution on the implied is 6.1 and on the EU calculated European way on the NTA, 3.7. Paul May So just to be clear, you're saying that you should trade at market cap, so your values are overstated? Because if you're comparing what you can raise at market cap versus what you can invest, I assume you'll be investing at gross asset value and therefore NTA, not at market cap? Or are you saying actually that the market cap is where the value is? Rolf Buch My job is as a management team, we are not responsible for the stock price. So that's why indirectly, we are not responsible for the magnitude of the market cap. We just have to do a good job that the market cap is going up. So that's why I didn't want to imply market cap is right or wrong. I just wanted to give you the figure, which are based on Page 43. And Paul, if I may add, I think we're always circling around the same traffic. I mean, if you look at today's rent levels, whatever measure you take, it's not a sustainable yield, full stop. Yes."

My stance on Vonovia and the bottom line In a nutshell, my bearish stance on Vonovia has not changed. I still think that Vonovia is a bad investment for long-term investors. What has changed though is my recommendation on Vonovia - from sell to hold. Why it is not a sell anymore? Fundamentally I think that Vonovia will continue to register worsening performance over the foreseeable future. Namely, I am bearish on Vonovia's fundamentals (see comments below). Yet, if we sum the following items together, I think that there is still a risk (or potential) out there that short sellers would get burned just as I did: EURIBOR has peaked and set to decline already this year. Once the actual decisions are made at the ECB, it is highly likely that the market will reprice the interest rate sensitive assets like Vonovia accordingly. Also, if more positive news emerge from ECB, Vonovia could shoot materially higher from the current levels. The current P/FCF multiple is still ~2.5x below the peak level and also low from the absolute perspective (i.e., P/FCF of ~ 9.7x). Hence, Vonovia is extremely sensitive to any positive news, which is not what prudent short sellers want to see. Vonovia is very likely to succeed in divestitures given the constrained supply of residential buildings in Germany and other old European markets. While prices will most probably be lower, it will do the thing for Vonovia by strengthening the liquidity profile for optimal management of forthcoming debt maturities. Why I am still bearish (via hold rating)? Look, let me first reemphasize some facts. Vonovia's net debt to EBITDA stands at ~15.3x, while the most indebted residential REIT in the U.S. carries a debt to EBITDA of 12.8x with the sector average being at ~5.7x. Such differences were sustainable when the interest rates were significantly different between the FED and ECB territories. Now both the interest rates have gone up and the spreads have decreased, which implies that Vonovia's ~ 15.3x net debt to EBITDA metric is out of whack. Vonovia will take all the necessary measures to avoid rolling ~1.7% yielding debt forward at much higher interest rates. Hence, we will see further divestitures taking place that will in the long-run reduce Vonovia's cash generation due to smaller portfolio size. This also means that on a go forward basis, the absolute amount of FFO generation will shrink. As of now, Vonovia's interest expenses would have to increase 121% to ca. €1.5bn for the ICR to fall below 1.8x (i.e., the current covenant). Given that the current average cost of debt is only 1.7%, an increase of more than 121% is not unrealistic. This year alone we saw ~25% increase in FFO interest expense, while the average cost of debt moved higher only by 20 basis points (from 1.5%). If Vonovia struggles with divestitures, the Stock could go very south. Finally, we have to appreciate the fact that we do not know for sure whether the interest rates will actually go down over the foreseeable future. There is also a reasonable probability that the current EURIBOR levels remain this high for longer period of time, thereby rendering Vonovia's divestitures less attractive and keeping the refinancing risk high. Vonovia is a hold for me Editor's Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.

Ein Artikel heute von Seeking Alpha: Reasons why Vonovia has performed so well The simple answer is multiple expansion. Vonovia YCharts Almost the entire amount of gains could be linked to an increase in Vonovia's valuation multiples. Moreover, if we adjust for the negative performance at the FFO and portfolio valuation levels, the gain from the multiple expansion has been so strong that is has not only sent the Stock price higher by ~50%, but also it has compensated the drop in earnings. Here is how the actual performance of Vonovia in 2023 looks like (a non-exhaustive list of key metrics based on a y-o-y comparison): Group FFO is down by 9.3%. Interest expense is higher by 25% despite the fact that the embedded cost of financing still sits at considerably depressed level of ~1.7%. Due to partial JV and minority holding sales, the actual FFO adjusted for non-controlling interest is even lower. The fair value corrections have finally started to occur with a total gross fair value adjustment of ~21% since the peak valuations in mid-2022. Even after the fair value adjustments and strong rental growth, the portfolio net yield still sits at unsustainable 3.3% level. Despite the massive divestitures, Vonovia has roughly EUR 10 billion to handle, where organically retiring these debt maturities is clearly not an option given the remaining cash flows after dividends. After all of the successful and sizeable divestitures during 2023, the net debt to EBITDA metrics has decreased only by 0.4x (from 15.7x as of year-end 2022 to 15.3x at year-end 2023). Namely, leverage remains elevated. I could go on and on with this list, but more important question here is what has caused Vonovia's multiples to expand. Clearly, it is not the fundamentals. There are three key drivers, which in my view explain the lion's share of the performance. First, the interest rates have reached a ceiling and the market has started to calibrate decreasing EURIBOR to relatively accommodative levels. For Vonovia this is massive considering not only the direct implications (e.g., lower cost of financing from incremental debt rollovers) but also the indirect ones such as more fluid M&A and debt market as the investors and lenders enjoy increased visibility for the deal pricing. Improving M&A and financing conditions are vital for Vonovia to continue executing on its divestiture strategy that is the only realistic avenue for sourcing capital to keep the refinancing in check. The more divestitures, the higher portions of maturing borrowings could be repaid, which in turn helps keep down the growing interest expense component. Second, Vonovia has made solid job on the divestiture front. While I was explicit on the unfavorable terms and conditions how most of these financing have been attracted, the real thing what matters is that the Company has successfully obtained fresh capital to purchase back at a discount most of the near-term bonds. During 2023, Vonovia sourced EUR 4 billion from divestitures, which also shielded the existing covenants from a continued deterioration. Third, at the time of issuance of my sell thesis, Vonovia traded at significantly depressed valuations - P/FCF of around 7.5x, which is more than 3x below the peak in 2021. Whenever a company trades at so low and historically cheap multiples, each assumption / result change in the positive direction is per definition set to provide a huge boost to the share price. Well, in this case we had a low multiple and two critical items becoming clearer (i.e., interest rate path and Vonovia's ability to divest) that together warranted a strong rebound.

Wenn man kein "fair value" braucht dann wie entscheidet man ob zB. für 24 euro Vonovia ist billig oder teuer? Dazu braucht man DCF oder eine andere Bewertungsmethode. Was ist DCF (sehr vereinfacht)? Ich nehme Analysten Schatzungen (Gewinn, FCF oder bei Vonovia FFO) für nachste einpaar Jahre und diese zukünftige Gewinne discountiere zurück mit meinen Renditenerwartungen zB. 10% jahrlich. Mein Bauchgefühl? Nein. Die Zahlen sind nicht meine Zahlen aber die Zahlen von mehreren Analysten (durchschnitt). In DCF ist nur eine Zahl von mir: Discount% ( wieviele Rendite brauche ich für mein investiertes Geld).

“ist ein wenig aufwendiger, als einfach mal 10 Zahlen zusammenzuhauen und den DCF zu berechnen”. Aber diese “10 Zahlen” bei DCF Rechnung nehme ich von Analysten.

Analysten nutzen weit mehr Daten als die vom Unternehmen bereitgestellten. Bspw. die Branchenentwicklung, sprich Daten der Konkurrenz, sie versuchen die Bilanzen der jeweiligen Unternehmen nach stillen Reserven und Lasten zu durchforsten, nutzen eigene Prognosen, die aus einem Marktmix an Informationen gebildet werden. Jeder Analyst lässt hier auch seine eigene subjektive Bewertung miteinfließen, die zwar mit Argumenten hinterlegt ist, jedoch keine spezifischen Zahlenwerte zulässt sondern nur Schätzwerte. Deswegen ja auch die große Spannbreite bei den Analystenschätzungen. Für diese ist das berechnete Kursziel der 'fair value' für in 12 Monaten. Der Begriff 'fair value' ist sowieso ein Widerspruch in sich, weil dort so viele subjektive Annahmen miteinfließen, dass letztlich kein objektiver Wert gebildet wird. Ich persönlich mache mir deshalb nicht die Mühe einen fair value zu berechnen, da der Nutzen niemals den Aufwand (ist ein wenig aufwendiger, als einfach mal 10 Zahlen zusammenzuhauen und den DCF zu berechnen) übersteigen würde bei der Höhe meines Anlagekapitals :D.