TUI - fachlicher Austausch WKN: TUAG50 ISIN: DE000TUAG505 Kürzel: TUI1 Forum: Aktien User: Deepblue

Die Frage ist für mich: warum waren keine Shortattacke im November und Dezember?

https://www.watson.de/leben/urlaub-freizeit/683946836-urlaub-lidl-reiseportal-stellt-seinen-betrieb-ueberraschend-ein

Diese Erzählung der Shortattacke ist nur die halbe Wahrheit. Es wurden immer wieder Positionen professioneller Investoren aufgebaut und zu den News direkt wieder abverkauft. Zuletzt ganz deutlich zum MDAX Märchen. Auch Blackrock hält jetzt wieder 3 Prozent. Werfen sie diese am 14. August auf den Markt, gibt der Kurs alleine schon dadurch 10 Prozent nach . Es muss nicht immer ein Shortie sein.

https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/11442671-gerald-klein/309… "Anatomy Of A Short Attack Abusive shorting are not random acts of a renegade hedge funds, but rather a coordinated business plan that is carried out by a collusive consortium of hedge funds and prime brokers, with help from their friends at the DTC and major clearinghouses. Potential target companies are identified, analyzed and prioritized. The attack is planned to its most minute detail. The plan consists of taking a large short position, then crushing the stock price, and, if possible, putting the company into bankruptcy. Bankrupting the company is a short homerun because they never have to buy real shares to cover and they don't pay taxes on the ill-gotten gain. When it is time to drive the stock price down, a blitzkrieg is unleashed against the company by a cabal of short hedge funds and prime brokers. The playbook is very similar from attack to attack, and the participating prime brokers and lead shorts are fairly consistent as well. Typical tactics include the following: Flooding the offer side of the board - Ultimately the price of a stock is found at the balance point where supply (offer) and demand (bid) for the shares find equilibrium. This equation happens every day for every stock traded. On days when more people want to buy than want to sell, the price goes up, and, conversely, when shares offered for sale exceed the demand, the price goes down. The shorts manipulate the laws of supply and demand by flooding the offer side with counterfeit shares. They will do what has been called a short down ladder. It works as follows: Short A will sell a counterfeit share at $10. Short B will purchase that counterfeit share covering a previously open position. Short B will then offer a short (counterfeit) share at $9. Short A will hit that offer, or short B will come down and hit Short A's $9 bid. Short A buys the share for $9, covering his open $10 short and booking a $1 profit. By repeating this process the shorts can put the stock price in a downward spiral. If there happens to be significant long buying, then the shorts draw from their reserve of "strategic fails-to-deliver" and flood the market with an avalanche of counterfeit shares that overwhelm the buy side demand. Attack days routinely see eighty percent or more of the shares offered for sale as counterfeit. Company news days are frequently attack days since the news will "mask" the extraordinary high volume. It doesn't matter whether it is good news or bad news. Massive counterfeiting can drive the stock price down in a matter of hours on extremely high volume. This is called "crashing" the stock and a successful "crash" is a one-day drop of twenty-percent or a thirty-five percent drop in a week. In order to make the crash "stick" or make it more effective, it is done concurrently with all or most of the following: Media Assault - The shorts, in order to realize their profit, must ultimately put the victim into bankruptcy or obtain shares at a price much cheaper than what they shorted at. These shares come from the investing public who panics and sells into the manipulation. Panic is induced with assistance from the financial media. The shorts have "friendly" reporters with the Dow Jones News Agency, the Wall Street Journal, Barrons, the New York Times, Gannett Publications (USA Today and the Arizona Republic), CNBC and others. "

“Company news days are frequently attack days since the news will "mask" the extraordinary high volume. It doesn't matter whether it is good news or bad news”

Q1 Bericht Tag war eindeutig ein Shortattack. Es hatte nichts mit Erwartungen zu tun.

Die Erwartungshaltung an TUI war da auch noch viel höher und die Träumerei, die Verluste aus dem Resplit wieder schnell aufzuholen. Mittlerweile sind aber alle ernüchtert. Das Problem hat ja auch TUI nicht alleine.

Und die Steigerung war steil bis 7,40.

Q1 Bericht

Ich spreche über Q' Bericht

Der TUI Q2 Bericht schließt mit einem Nettoverlust von rund 190 Millionen oder 5 Cent Verlust pro Euro Umsatz. Angesichts der dort bereits geltenden Preiserhöhungen aus 2023 und 2024 und hoher Schiffsauslastung hätte ich ein Ereignis Richtung Nulllinie erwartet. Die Zahlen waren nur auf den ersten Blick gut.

Q2=Q1 Bericht

Dort ist zB. Q2 Bericht die Zahlen waren super, der Kurs steigerte schnell bis 7,40 aber das war trigger für Shorties und 2 Stunden spater der Kurs war bei 6,20.

Dieses Jahr der Kurs wurde bei Verfallstag immer zurückgezogen von LVs. Im April wurde ganz ahnlich wie jetzt: unter 6 Handelstagen und die grösse -1,46 euro. Aber im November und Dezember 2023. passierte nichts bei Verfallstag. Im November war sogar steile Steigerung. Wo waren dann Shorties? Und am 14.08. Q3 Bericht. Aber am 16.08. wieder Verfallstag. Warum würden guten Zahlen einen neuen Shortattack verhindern? “Company news days are frequently attack days since the news will "mask" the extraordinary high volume. It doesn't matter whether it is good news or bad news”